Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer Distributed Hash Tables by Emil Sit & Robert Morris
Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer
Distributed Hash Tables
Emil Sit and Robert Morris
Laboratory for Computer Science, MIT
200 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
fsit,rtmg@lcs.mit.edu
Abstract. Recent peer-to-peer research has focused on providing ef-
cient hash lookup systems that can be used to build more complex
systems. These systems have good properties when their algorithms are
executed correctly but have not generally considered how to handle mis-
behaving nodes. This paper looks at what sorts of security problems are
inherent in large peer-to-peer systems based on distributed hash lookup
systems. We examine the types of problems that such systems might
face, drawing examples from existing systems, and propose some design
principles for detecting and preventing these problems.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer systems present an interesting security problem as there is no cen-
tral system to protect. Instead, the nodes must work together to ensure correct
and secure behavior. Unfortunately, deployment on an open network, such as the
Internet, implies that there will be malicious nodes in the system. These nodes
will try and disrupt the system or subvert it to their advantage. Peer-to-peer
systems must be designed to operate correctly even in these situations.
A number of recent systems are built on top of peer-to-peer distributed hash
lookup systems [5, 6, 9, 10]. Lookups for keys are performed by routing queries
through a series of nodes; each of these nodes uses a local routing table to
forward the query towards the node that is ultimately responsible for the key.
These systems can be used to store data, for example, as a distributed hash
table or le system [1, 7]. Other projects take advantage of other aspects of the
lookup system, such as the properties of lookup routing [8]. In this paper, we
will examine security concerns that are particular to distributed hash tables.
One class of attacks on distributed hash tables causes the system to return
incorrect data to the application. Fortunately, the correctness and authenticity of
data can be addressed using cryptographic techniques such as self-certifying path
names [3]. These techniques allow the system to detect and ignore inauthentic
data.
This paper focuses on the remaining attacks | those that threaten the live-
ness of the system by preventing participants from nding data. We begin by
presenting a common framework for distributed hash tables in Section 2, fol-
lowed by the basic adversary model in Section 3. The core of the paper is inTable 1. Design Principles
Dene veriable system invariants (and verify them!)
Allow the querier to observe lookup progress.
Assign keys to nodes in a veriable way.
Server selection in routing may be abused.
Cross-check routing tables using random queries.
Avoid single points of responsibility.
Section 4, where we present a series of examples of particular weaknesses in ex-
isting distributed hash lookup systems. From these discussions, we derive a set
of general design principles, shown in Table 1. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Background
Typical distributed hash tables consist of a storage API layered on top of a
lookup protocol. Lookup protocols share a few basic components:
1. a key identier space,
2. a node identier space,
3. rules for associating keys to particular nodes,
4. per-node routing tables that refer to other nodes, and
5. rules for updating routing tables as nodes join and fail.
The lookup protocol maps a desired key identier to the IP address of the node
responsible for that key. A storage protocol layered on top of the lookup protocol
then takes care of storing, replicating, caching, retrieving, and authenticating the
data. CAN [5], Chord [9] and Pastry [6] all t into this general framework.
Routing in the lookup is handled by dening a distance function on the
identier space so that distance can be measured between the current node and
the desired key; the responsible node is dened to be the node closest to the key.
Lookup protocols typically have an invariant that must be maintained in
order to guarantee that data can be found. For example, the Chord system
arranges nodes in a one-dimensional (but circular) identier space; the required
invariant is that every node knows the node that immediately follows it in the
identier space. If an attacker could break this invariant, Chord would not be
able to look up keys correctly.
Similarly, the storage layer will also maintain some invariants in order to be
sure that each piece of data is available. In the case of DHash [1], a storage
API layered on Chord used by CFS, there are two important invariants. First, it
must ensure that the node that Chord believes is responsible for a key actually
stores the data associated with that key. Since nodes can fail, it is also important
that DHash maintain replicas of each piece of data, and that those replicas be at
predictable nodes. An attacker could potentially target either of these invariants.3 Adversary Model
The adversaries that we consider in this paper are participants in a distributed
hash lookup system that do not follow the protocol correctly. Instead, they seek
to mislead legitimate nodes by providing them with false information.
We assume that a malicious node is able to generate packets with arbitrary
contents (including forged source IP addresses), but that a node is only able
to examine packets addressed to itself. That is, malicious nodes are not able
to overhear or modify communication between other nodes. The fact that a
malicious node can only receive packets addressed to its own IP address means
that an IP address can be used as a weak form of node identity; if a node receives
a packet from an IP address, it can verify that the packet's sender owns the
address by sending a request for conrmation to that address. We also consider
malicious nodes that conspire together, but where each one is limited as above.
This allows an adversary to gather additional data and act more deviously by
providing false but \conrmable" information.
The rest of the paper will examine the ways in which malicious nodes can
use these abilities to subvert the system.
4 Attacks and Defenses
This section is organized into attacks against the routing, attacks against the
data storage system, and nally some general considerations.
The rst line of defense for any attack is detection. Many attacks can be
detected by the node being attacked because they involve violating invariants or
procedure contracts. However, it is less clear what to do once an attack has been
detected. A node may genuinely be malicious, or it may have failed to detect
that it was being tricked. Thus, our discussion focuses on methods to detect and
possibly correct inconsistent information. We will see that achieving veriability
underlies all of our detection techniques.
4.1 Routing Attacks
The routing portion of a lookup protocol involves maintaining routing tables and
then dispatching requests to the nodes in the routing table. It is critical that
routing is correct in a distributed hash table. However, there is considerable room
for an adversary to play in existing systems. These attacks can be detected if the
system denes veriable system invariants (and veries them). When invariants
fail, the system must have a recovery mechanism.
Incorrect Lookup Routing. An individual malicious node could forward lookups
to an incorrect or non-existent node. Since the malicious node would be par-
ticipating in the routing update system in a normal way, it would appear to
be alive, and would not ordinarily be removed from the routing tables of othernodes. Thus re-transmissions of the misdirected lookups would also be sent to
the malicious node.
Fortunately, blatantly incorrect forwarding can often be easily detected. At
each hop, the querier knows that the lookup is supposed to get \closer" to the
key identier. For example, in Pastry, each hop should match the key identier
in at least one more digit than the last. The querier should check for this so
that this attack can be detected. If such an attack is detected, the querier might
recover by backtracking to the last good hop and asking for an alternate step.
In order for the querier to be able to perform this check, however, each
step of progress must be visible to the querier. For example, CAN proposes
an optimization where each node keeps track of the network RTTs to neighbor
nodes and forwards to the neighbor with the best ratio of progress to RTT.
This implies that queries are generally forwarded without interacting with the
querier. Thus in CAN, a querier simply can not verify forward progress. One
should allow the querier to observe lookup progress.
A malicious node might also simply declare (incorrectly) that a random node
is the node responsible for a key. Since the querying node might be far away in
the identier space, it might not know that this node is, in fact, not the closest
node. This could cause a key to be stored on an incorrect node or prevent the
key from being found. This can be xed with two steps.
First, the querier should ensure that the destination itself agrees that it is a
correct termination point for the query. In Chord, the predecessor returns the
address of the query endpoint (the \successor") instead of the endpoint itself,
making this attack possible | a malicious node can cause the query to overshoot
the correct successor. Since the querier Q does not know about the true successor
S, a malicious predecessor P could forward to some node S0 > S. This can cause
DHash to violate its storage location invariant. However, if S0 is good, then it
can see that it should not be responsible for this key and can raise an error.
Second, the system should assign keys to nodes in a veriable way. In partic-
ular, in some systems, keys are assigned to the node that is closest to them in the
identier space. Thus in order to assign keys to nodes veriably, it is sucient
to derive node identiers in a veriable way. Contrast this to CAN, which allows
any node to specify its own identity. This makes it impossible for another node
to verify that a node is validly claiming responsibility for a key. Some systems,
like Chord, make an eort to defend against this by basing a node's identier on
a cryptographic hash of its IP address and port.1 Since this is needed to contact
the node, it is easy to tell if one is speaking to the correct node.
Systems may want to consider deriving long-term identities based on public
keys. This has performance penalties due to the cost of signatures, but would
allow systems to have faith on the origin of messages and the validity of their
contents. That is, public keys would facilitate the veriability of the system. For
example, a certicate with a node's public key and address can be used by new
nodes to safely join the system.
1 The hash actually also includes a virtual node identier, which will be relevant in
Section 4.2Incorrect Routing Updates. Since each node in a lookup system builds its routing
table by consulting other nodes, a malicious node could corrupt the routing tables
of other nodes by sending them incorrect updates. The eect of these updates
would be to cause innocent nodes to misdirect queries to inappropriate nodes, or
to non-existent nodes. However, if the system knows that correct routing updates
have certain requirements, these can be veried. For example, Pastry updates
require that each table entry has a correct prex. Blatantly incorrect updates can
be easily identied and dropped. Other updates should only be incorporated into
a node's routing table after it has veried itself that the remote node is reachable.
A more subtle attack would be to take advantage of systems that allow nodes
to choose between multiple correct routing entries. For example, CAN's RTT
optimization allows precisely this in order to minimize latency. A malicious node
can abuse this exibility and provide nodes that are undesirable. For example,
it might choose an unreliable node, one with high latency, or even a fellow
malicious node. While this may not aect strict correctness of the protocol, it
may impact applications that may wish to use the underlying lookup system
to nd nodes satisfying certain criteria. For example, the Tarzan anonymizing
network [2] proposes the use of Chord as a way of discovering random nodes to
use in dynamic anonymizing tunnels. Any exibility in Chord might allow an
adversary to bias the nodes chosen, compromising the design goals of Tarzan.
Applications should be aware that server selection in routing may be abused.
Partition. In order to bootstrap, a new node participating in any lookup system
must contact some existing node. At this time, it is vulnerable to being parti-
tioned into an incorrect network. Suppose a set of malicious nodes has formed
a parallel network, running the same protocols as the real, legitimate network.
This parallel network is entirely internally consistent and may even contain some
of the data from the real network. A new node may join this network acciden-
tally and thus fail to achieve correct results. One of the malicious nodes might
also be cross-registered in the legitimate network and may be able to cause new
participants to be connected to the parallel network even if they have a valid
bootstrap node.
Partitions can be used by malicious nodes to deny service or to learn about
the behavior of clients that it would otherwise be unable to observe. For example,
if a service was made available to publish documents anonymously, an adversary
could establish a malicious system that shadows the real one but allows it to
track clients who are reading and storing les.
In order to prevent a new node from being diverted into an incorrect network,
it must bootstrap via some sort of trusted source. This source will likely be
out-of-band to the system itself. When rejoining the system, a node can either
use these trusted nodes, or it can use one of the other nodes it has previously
discovered in the network. However, building trust metrics for particular nodes
can be dangerous in a network with highly transient nodes that lack any strong
sense of identity. If a particular address is assigned via DHCP, for example, a
node could be malicious one day but benign the next. Again, use of public keys
may reduce this risk.If a node believes it has successfully bootstrapped in the past, then it can
detect new malicious partitions by cross-checking results. A node can maintain
a set of other nodes that it has used successfully in the past. Then, it can cross-
check routing tables using random queries.2 By asking those nodes to do ran-
dom queries and comparing their results with its own results, a node can verify
whether its view of the network is consistent with those other nodes. Note that
randomness is important so that a malicious partition can not distinguish veri-
cation probes from a legitimate query that it would like to divert. Conversely, a
node that has been trapped in a malicious partition might accidentally discover
the correct network in this manner, where the \correct" network here is dened
as the one which serves desired data.
4.2 Storage and Retrieval Attacks
A malicious node could join and participate in the lookup protocol correctly,
but deny the existence of data it was responsible for. Similarly, it might claim
to actually store data when asked, but then refuse to serve it to clients. In order
to handle this attack, the storage layer must implement replication. Replication
must be handled in a way so that no single node is responsible for replication or
facilitating access to the replicas; that node would be a single point of failure. So,
for example, clients must be able to independently determine the correct nodes to
contact for replicas. This would allow them to verify that data is truly unavailable
with all replica sites. Similarly, all nodes holding replicas must ensure that the
replication invariant (e.g. at least r copies exist at all times) is maintained.
Otherwise, a single node would be able to prevent all replication from happening.
In summary, avoid single points of responsibility.
Clients doing lookups must be prepared for the possibility of malicious nodes
as well. Thus, they must consult at least two replica sites in order to be sure
that either all of the replicas are bad or that the data is truly missing.
As an example, DHash does not follow this principle: only the node imme-
diately associated with the key is responsible for replication. However, even if
the storing node performed replication, DHash would still be vulnerable to the
actual successor lying about the r later successors. Replication with multiple
hash functions, as proposed in CAN, is one way to avoid this reliance on a single
machine.
This attack can be further rened in a system that does not assign nodes
veriable identiers. In such a system, a node can choose to become responsible
for data that it wishes to hide. DHash continues to be at risk here, despite Chord
having veriable node identiers, because the identier is derived from a hash of
the node's IP address, port number and virtual node number. Since a person in
control of a single node can run a large number of virtual nodes, they can still
eect some degree of choice in what data they wish to hide. IPv6 or sparsely
used IPv4 networks may also allow a single host to appear to run many nodes.
2 Of course, without a sense of node identity that is stronger than IP address, this is
still dangerous.4.3 Miscellaneous Attacks
Inconsistent Behavior. Any of the attacks here can be made more dicult to
detect if a malicious node presents a good face to part of the network. That is, a
malicious node may choose to maximize its impact by ensuring that it behaves
correctly for certain nodes. One possible target would be nodes near it in the
identier space. These nodes will not see any reason to remove the node from
their routing tables despite the fact that nodes that are distant see poor or invalid
behavior. This may not be a serious problem if queries must be routed through
close nodes before reaching the target node. However, most routing systems have
ways of jumping to distant points in the identier space in order to speed up
queries.
Ideally, distant nodes would be able to convince local nodes that the \locally
good" malicious node is in fact malicious. However, without public keys and
digital signatures, it is not possible to distinguish a report of a \locally good"
node being malicious, from a malicous report trying to tarnish a node that is
actually benign. On the other hand, with public keys, this can be proven by
requiring nodes to sign all of their responses. Then a report would contain the
incorrect response and the incongruity could be veried. Lacking this, each node
must make its own determination as to whether another node is malicious.
Overload of Targeted Nodes. Since an adversary can generate packets, it can
attempt to overload targetted nodes with garbage packets. This is a standard
denial of service attack and not really a subversion of the system. This will cause
the node to appear to fail and the system will be able to adapt to this as if the
node had failed in some normal manner. A system must use some degree of data
replication to handle even the normal case of node failure. This attack may be
eective if the replication is weak (i.e. the malicious nodes can target all replicas
easily) or if the malicious node is one of the replicas or colluding with some of
the replicas.
The impact of denial of service attacks can be partially mitigated by ensuring
that the node identier assignment algorithm assigns identiers to nodes ran-
domly with respect to network topology. Additionally, replicas should be located
in physically disparate locations. These would prevent a localized attack from
preventing access to an entire portion of the key space. If an adversary did wish
to shut out an entire portion of the key space, it would have to ood packets all
over the Internet.
Rapid Joins and Leaves. As nodes join and leave the system, the rules for associ-
ating keys to nodes imply that new nodes must obtain data (from replicas) that
was stored by nodes that have left the system. This rebalancing is required in
order for the lookup procedures to work correctly. A malicious node could trick
the system into rebalancing unnecessarily causing excess data transfers and con-
trol trac. This will reduce the eciency and performance of the system; it may
even be possible to overload network segments. This attack would work best
if the attacker could avoid being involved in data movement since that wouldconsume the bulk of the bandwidth. An adversary might try to convince the
system that a particular node was unavailable or that a new node had (falsely)
joined. However, our model allows the adversary no (low-bandwidth) way of ac-
complishing the former; the latter case presumably will involve acknowledged
data transfers that the adversary can not correctly acknowledge. Any other re-
balancing would involve the adversary node itself, requiring it to be involved in
the data movement.
Note that any distributed hash table must provide a mechanism for dealing
with this problem, regardless of whether there are malicious nodes present. Early
studies have shown that in some le sharing systems, peers join and leave the
system very rapidly [4]. The rate of replication and amount of data stored at
each node must be kept at levels that allow for timely replication without causing
network overload when even regular nodes join and leave the network.
Unsolicited Messages. A malicious node may be able to engineer a situation
where it can send an unsolicited response to a query. For example, consider an
iterative lookup process where querier Q is referred by node E to node A. Node
E knows that Q will next contact A, presumably with a follow-up to the query
just processed by E. Thus, E can attempt to forge a message from A to Q with
incorrect results.
The best defense against this would be to employ standard authentication
techniques such as digital signatures or message authentication codes. However,
digital signatures are currently expensive and MACs require shared keys. A more
reasonable defense may be to include a random nonce with each query and have
the remote end echo the nonce in its reply. This would essentially ensure the
origin of the response.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a categorization of the basic attacks that peer-to-peer hash
lookup systems should be aware of. It discusses details of those attacks as applied
to some specic systems, and suggests defenses in many cases. It abstracts these
defenses into this set of general design principles: 1) dene veriable system
invariants, and verify them; 2) allow the querier to observe lookup progress; 3)
assign keys to nodes in a veriable way; 4) be wary of server selection in routing;
5) cross-check routing tables using random queries; and 6) avoid single points of
responsibility.
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